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A single inspectorate for children and learners 
Ofsteds response to the DfES consultation paper 
 
1. Ofsted welcomes the proposals in the consultation paper. We are 
committed to their successful implementation, working closely with the 
Department for Education and Skills (DfES) and other government 
departments, with the other inspectorates affected by these proposals and 
with stakeholders outside government. In recent years Ofsted has 
consistently demonstrated its capacity to take on and make a success of 
new functions. These now extend from childcare and aspects of child 
protection to education provision for 19-year-olds. Transferring to Ofsted 
the duties covered by the consultation paper is therefore a very practical 
proposition. 
 
2. We believe moreover that the direction of travel proposed is the right one, 
for the following reasons: 
• from the perspective of the users of the services inspected (children, 
learners, parents, employers), a single inspectorate for children and 
learners will make it easier to present broad and relevant information and 
to do so in a consistent way 
• from the point of view of those inspected, fewer inspectorates will 
mean less complex, less duplicatory and therefore less burdensome 
inspection arrangements 
• the approach proposed is consistent with the thrust of government 
policy, for example in relation to the functions of childrens services 
departments at local authority level and in relation to education policy for 
those aged 14 to 19 
• the inclusion of employment based training within Ofsteds remit would 
mean that for the first time a single inspectorate was able to speak 
authoritatively about the relationship between education and 
employment 
• by bringing the work of a number of inspectorates together, it will be 
possible to realise efficiency improvements in inspection 
arrangements, coupled with economies in back office support.  
 
3. Our comments on the questions raised in the consultation paper are given 
below. Beyond the specific questions, we have commented only where we 
wish to make a suggestion about what is proposed. Where we do not 
comment, it is because we support in full the proposals. 
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The proposition that the ALIs existing inspection remit 
should be merged with the current work of Ofsted to create 
a single inspectorate for children and learners 
 
4. The case for this change is, if anything, even more compelling than that in 
relation to the work of the Commission for Social Care Inspection (CSCI) 
and Her Majestys Inspectorate of Court Administration (HMICA). The joint 
inspection of further education colleges by Ofsted and the Adult Learning 
Inspectorate (ALI) under the Learning and Skills Act 2000 was designed to 
ensure that colleges were not disadvantaged by the split of responsibilities 
between Ofsted and the ALI, but it was always recognised that the joint 
working would involve a certain amount of additional administration and 
additional costs for the inspectorates themselves. The distinction between 
further education for 1619-year-olds and for those over 19 is in many 
respects an artificial one. 
 
5. Many of those who conduct these inspections on behalf of Ofsted and the 
ALI  whether permanent employees (Her Majestys Inspectors in the case 
of Ofsted) or additional inspectors  come from very similar, if not 
identical, professional backgrounds. ALI inspectors and HMI have often 
been colleagues at previous stages in their careers, for example when 
working for the former Further Education Funding Council. Many of the 
additional inspectors used in college inspections are employed by both 
inspectorates and are able to work in the remits of both. 
 
6. As a consequence, members of joint Ofsted/ALI inspection teams do not 
necessarily confine themselves to inspecting their inspectorates 
responsibilities when working together in a college. In practice, HMI 
frequently inspect post-19 and work related provision, while ALI inspectors 
similarly inspect education provision where this makes sense. Locating all 
college inspection work within Ofsted will remove this artificial and 
unnecessary distinction. 
 
7. Similarly, there are some common skill sets in relation to the inspection of 
employment based training. Plainly the single remit of the ALI  including 
the inspection of work based learning, learndirect provision, adult and 
community learning, and training funded by Jobcentre Plus  means that 
Ofsted would need to make full use of the expertise of ALI inspectors. 
These staff would form the bulk of the relevant workforce at Ofsted, as 
they do at the ALI; there would be no intention to engage the majority of 
HMI in these tasks. However, where individual HMI had the relevant skills 
and experience, it would be effective and efficient for them to work 
alongside the capacity transferred from the ALI. 
 
8. Ofsted has strong links with all its main stakeholder groups, including 
colleges and employers. Through the transfer of staff from the ALI we 
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would further strengthen the links with employers in particular. This 
should be undertaken in parallel with the Departments proposals for the 
governance of Ofsted. 
 
Whether there should be, in legislation, a single overarching 
statement to capture the core purpose of the inspectorate 
and characterise its overall ethos 
 
9. In principle, we would welcome a statement of this kind. However, with 
the exception of the first, the points suggested in paragraph 28 of the 
consultation paper do not seem to us to be parts of a core purpose, but 
rather approaches or principles to be taken into account in designing 
methods of inspection. 
 
10. We believe that an overarching statement of core purpose should start 
from the inspection and regulation of education, learning and care, and 
should include the following: 
• in relation to those public services falling within Ofsteds remit, to make 
available independent and authoritative information about the quality of 
provision to the users and providers of the services, and to ministers and 
Parliament: reporting without fear or favour 
• to encourage improvement in services and better outcomes for children 
and learners 
• in doing so, to listen to the users of services; provide information about 
value for money from public spending on the services inspected and so 
strengthen accountability; and, subject to any other legislative provisions, 
ensure that inspection is proportionate to risk (the proviso is because 
primary and more particularly secondary legislation currently constrains 
the extent of proportionality) 
• to guarantee standards in the services that are regulated (as opposed to 
inspected). 
 
11. So far as a statutory duty in relation to improvement is concerned, there is 
already a strong portfolio of contributions that Ofsted makes to 
improvement:  
• national data that support government decision making and research 
• frameworks of inspection (and national standards) that establish 
baselines of good practice 
• follow-up inspections for institutions with major weaknesses 
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• identification of actions and key issues with recommendations in 
individual reports 
• publication of grades that motivate improvement 
• national publications that influence and disseminate good practice  
• public information to parents and stakeholders that informs choice.  
 
With a new statutory duty, we would want to build on this work without 
compromising our core functions of inspection and regulation.  
 
12. In considering the scope of an overarching statement of this kind for 
Ofsted, we would encourage the DfES to consult the Office of the Deputy 
Prime Minister (ODPM), the Department of Health and the Home Office 
(and others, as appropriate) to see whether similar statements can be 
agreed for the Local Services Inspectorate, the Healthcare Commission 
and the new criminal justice inspectorate. The logic of the governments 
proposal that there should be four main public service inspectorates is that 
they should operate under a broadly similar remit. Establishing this would 
be a way of underpinning the proposed high level duty in paragraph 29, 
to cooperate effectively with other public services inspectorates. We 
recognise that ministers may also wish to reinforce this latter duty with 
more specific legislative provisions. At the same time, one of the great 
benefits of the governments proposals is that, with fewer inspectorates, it 
should become much simpler for four Chief Inspectors to work informally 
together to streamline shared processes.  
 
Is the list at paragraph 29 of the consultation document a 
fair representation of the high level duties of an enlarged 
Ofsted? 
 
13. We think that the high level duties proposed would sit appropriately under 
a core purpose such as that suggested above. Although implicit in the list, 
we think it would be important to refer specifically to users in these 
duties: for example, to require reports to be made, where possible, in 
ways that are accessible to the users of the services inspected. If 
providing information to ministers and to users is specifically included at 
this point of the legislation, it would be appropriate to complete the 
picture (and link with the high level purpose in relation to improvement) 
by including reference to the accessibility and relevance of information 
and reports to providers of the services inspected. 
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Opportunities for the rationalisation of inspection 
legislation 
 
14. We support the general approach proposed of transferring current duties 
to Ofsted as they stand, but arranging for childrens services inspections 
to be carried out by Ofsted under a single inspection function. The move 
to a single inspectorate would allow Ofsted to continue the work already 
started to rationalise the frameworks for inspection across all types of 
inspection, to integrate more effectively the inspection of local services for 
children with the inspection of institutions and to make better use of the 
expertise of the inspection workforce. In addition, more might be done to 
make all inspection proportionate to risk and to provide better value. 
Beyond that, we suggest the following specific opportunity for 
rationalisation. 
 
15. Independent specialist colleges are currently inspected by both Ofsted and 
the ALI (because they receive funding from the Learning and Skills 
Council) and regulated by CSCI, which classifies them as care homes. Care 
homes are regarded by CSCI as catering solely for adults. The regulation 
of the care provision within them would, other things being equal, 
therefore transfer from CSCI to the Healthcare Commission. This would 
perpetuate the split responsibility in respect of the education and care 
inspections of these colleges. The Department may want to consider 
whether this is an area where specific legislative provision could secure 
unified inspection and regulation by Ofsted. 
 
If the ALIs statutory post-16 learning and skills inspection 
functions were to be brought within a single inspectorate, 
how might its quality improvement and commissioned 
support and advice roles best be handled in the future? 
 
16. We believe that the advisory function of the ALI provided by Excalibur and 
the Provider Development Unit (PDU) should be separated from the 
inspection function. The PDU provides information, advice, guidance and 
support for work based providers and Jobcentre Plus that are to be 
reinspected. Excalibur provides a range of events, products and online 
services that provide examples of good practice. We suggest that both 
functions might be better placed with the Quality Improvement Agency 
(QIA), which will have the task of supporting and driving systematic 
improvement across the sector. This will simplify the responsibilities for 
quality improvement by placing them within a single organisation. It will 
also ensure that inspection and advice are kept as separate functions. 
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Should the separate functions of the Childrens Rights 
Director be retained under the new arrangements and, if so, 
should they be given to the single inspectorate for children 
and learners, to the Childrens Commissioner, or split 
between the two? 
  
17. Ofsted believes that the nature of the functions of the Childrens Rights 
Director is such that, now that the Childrens Commissioner is in post, they 
would sit more appropriately with the Commissioner. However, we would 
of course be willing to incorporate these functions, if that were ministers 
decision. In that event, it would be appropriate to set the role in the 
context of the functions of Ofsteds Strategic Board (see paragraph 24 
below) and of any relevant proposals included in the recent White Paper 
on schools.  
 
Views on the suggested new statutory title for Ofsted to 
match and reflect its wider remit: the Inspectorate for 
Children and Learners 
 
18. We think this is an excellent suggestion, reflecting the emphasis on users 
that is central to our approach to inspection and regulation. 
 
Views on how an enlarged Ofsted might be generally known 
19. We would argue strongly for the retention of the name Ofsted. Repeated 
surveys have shown that it is one of the strongest brands in the public 
sector, with particularly wide currency among parents, who see it as a 
mark of authoritative, independent and reliable judgement. Plainly, 
Ofsted could no longer stand simply for the Office for Standards in 
Education. If the post of Her Majestys Chief Inspector of Schools (HMCI) 
were retitled Her Majestys Chief Inspector of Education, Training and 
Care, this would become the formal derivation of Ofsted. 
 
Do you support the suggested change in Ofsteds 
governance to reflect its enlarged and wider remit? 
 
20. We welcome the proposal to retain Ofsteds status as a non-ministerial 
government department; this, in our view, properly reflects the 
importance of the functions assigned to Ofsted and the standing of the 
organisation. It symbolises the way in which Ofsted is part of central 
government, while retaining independence of judgement. 
 
21. Similarly, we very much welcome the proposal that the non-executive role 
in Ofsteds corporate governance should be strengthened. Indeed, Ofsted 
had agreed plans for doing so earlier this year. These have been deferred 
pending the outcome of the present consultation. 
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22. Thinking about corporate governance has moved on significantly since 
Ofsted was established, and we believe that a model of the kind 
suggested in the consultation paper, with clear responsibilities both for a 
non-executive chair and for the Chief Inspector, would work effectively. 
However, Ofsteds current governance has real strengths, which we would 
wish to see built on and enhanced in any new arrangements. 
 
23. The clarity of responsibility vested in HMCI as, in effect, Ofsteds 
combined chairman/chief executive has meant not only that the Chief 
Inspector is the authoritative and clear voice of Ofsted, but also that he is 
the key decision maker within the organisation. This has meant both that 
accountability  to ministers and to Parliament  is transparent and 
unambiguous, and that the decision making process has been rapid and 
uncluttered. It is one reason why Ofsted has been able to respond quickly 
to new demands. By contrast, we would argue that there have been 
examples in the public sector over the past decade where the dual 
leadership of organisations has made it difficult for stakeholders to know 
where the real decision making power lies and has seriously hampered the 
effectiveness of internal decision making. 
 
24. It is therefore essential that the respective responsibilities of the proposed 
non-executive chair (and board) and HMCI are drawn clearly and 
unambiguously. HMCI should remain the key operational decision maker 
and the authoritative voice of Ofsted, both in public and in advice to 
Ministers. With its enlarged remit, the demands placed on Ofsted will be 
complex. The role of the chair will be vital. The chair should stand back 
from the detail, monitor Ofsteds strategic performance and environment, 
and on this basis provide challenge and support to HMCI and the 
executive team. The chair (with the board as a whole) should also have 
specific oversight of matters such as corporate governance and could have 
statutory responsibility to monitor areas such as stakeholder relations or 
complaints.  
 
25. The nature and quality of appointments will be key to making a success of 
the new governance arrangements. The chair will need the ability and 
experience to see a complex organisation as a whole. Moreover, it will be 
important not to compromise Ofsteds independence in the non-executive 
membership of the board. Listening to stakeholders should be central to 
Ofsteds remit, but this cannot and should not determine the composition 
of the board: cannot, because Ofsted has too many groups of key 
stakeholders for adequate representation on the board to be possible (this 
would be even more true under the proposed new remit); should not, 
because the board should be concerned to see that Ofsted effectively 
discharges its responsibilities in relation to all stakeholders, not to  
represent particular interests.  
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26. Finally, we would encourage ministers to move as quickly as possible to 
establish shadow governance arrangements for the new remit of Ofsted. 
While recognising that Parliaments approval of the necessary legislation 
cannot be pre-empted, there is a risk of prolonged planning blight unless 
clear governance arrangements are in place well in advance of the 
proposed transfer of responsibilities. The fact that Ofsteds current 
governance arrangements are not specified in legislation should give 
substantial scope for flexibility in this matter. For parallel reasons, clarity 
will be needed about governance in relation to decisions taken over the 
next 18 months by CSCI, HMICA and, subject to the Secretary of States 
decision, ALI, to the extent that these have implications running beyond 
March 2007. We stand ready to discuss possible approaches with the 
Department. 
 
Ofsteds Strategic Board 
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